150

A while back I saw posted on someone's office door a statement attributed to some famous person, saying that it is an instance of the callousness of youth to think that a theorem is trivial because its proof is trivial.

I don't remember who said that, and the person whose door it was posted on didn't remember either.

This leads to two questions:

  1. Who was it? And where do I find it in print—something citable? (Let's call that one question.)

  2. What are examples of nontrivial theorems whose proofs are trivial? Here's a wild guess: let's say for example a theorem of Euclidean geometry has a trivial proof but doesn't hold in non-Euclidean spaces and its holding or not in a particular space has far-reaching consequences not all of which will be understood within the next 200 years. Could that be an example of what this was about? Or am I just missing the point?

LSpice
  • 11,423
Michael Hardy
  • 11,922
  • 11
  • 81
  • 119
  • 14
    This is anti-climactic since you (rather quickly!) chose an answer, but what is your definition of "nontrivial theorem"? For example, would Schur's Lemma or Maschke's theorem have counted? – Boyarsky Jun 20 '10 at 02:10
  • 1
    I thought it was Grothendieck (who also said something to the effect that one mustn't prove a theorem that isn't trivial). – Akhil Mathew Jun 20 '10 at 02:10
  • 9
    Very often non-trivial theorems become definitions, or new definitions are specifically chosen so that they become trivial. Thereafter, they have trivial proofs. For example, the fact that homology is invariant under homotopy is (almost) trivial once you know singular homology. Even more often, our whole way of viewing math changes so that we get used to some new amazing discovery (as in Joel's example of existence of uncountable sets below) – Ilya Grigoriev Jun 20 '10 at 03:03
  • 1
    See some interesting remarks on a priori and a posteriori triviality in mathematics in http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.146.2009&rep=rep1&type=pdf, in the last section. – Joel David Hamkins Jun 20 '10 at 03:05
  • 24
    "callousness" or "callowness"? – Yemon Choi Jun 20 '10 at 03:12
  • 2
    Rota seems largely to take the opposing view to the quotation in this thoughtful essay: http://books.google.com/books?id=B9VJKEQlzukC&pg=RA1-PT197#v=onepage&q&f=false – Joel David Hamkins Jun 20 '10 at 03:22
  • 4
    To Boyarsky: he chose the answer because it gave the source of the quote. – Zsbán Ambrus Jun 20 '10 at 11:43
  • 3
    @Zsbán Ambrus: He accepted the answer before the source was added. – S. Carnahan Jun 20 '10 at 13:44
  • 3
    @Zsbán Ambrus, @Scott Carnahan. I think the history is that Daniel Barter's answer was accepted first, then mine (before I added the source of the quote), then Coudy's (after I added the source of the quote, but giving the quote in a different context -- apparently Grothendieck mentions this quote from Whitehead at least twice). – John Stillwell Jun 20 '10 at 23:31
  • 11
    Something from Spivak's "Calculus on Manifolds" is particularly germane to this discussion:

    "There are good reasons why theorems should all be easy and the definitions hard [...] Definitions serve a twofold purpose: they are rigorous replacements for vague notions, and machinery for elegant proofs. [...] A fully evolved major theorem has three important attributes: (1) It is trivial. (2) It is trivial because the terms appearing in it have been properly defined. (3) It has significant consequences."

    – Selene Routley Jun 10 '11 at 00:37
  • 3
    Goro Shimura wrote in his book The Map of My Life: In any case, it is absolutely wrong to think "the more difficult, the better" in mathematics. If one proves a theorem, its importance depends solely on the theorem, not on how difficult the proof is. But strangely, there are many, incredibly many, mathematicians who say, "That theorem is not of much value, because its proof is not difficult." – Makoto Kato Jul 24 '13 at 03:32
  • 3
    Hilbert once said something to the effect that you don't really understand a theorem until you think its proof is trivial. – Nik Weaver Mar 03 '14 at 23:04
  • 1
    Does anyone have any idea why this answer was down-voted? ${}\qquad{}$ – Michael Hardy Dec 01 '15 at 19:16
  • 1
    I was in a seminar of JF Adams in Oxford (1958-59) when JHCW came out with this comment, and eventually I posted it in Math Intell. but I can't give the exact reference. His example was the Cantor-Bernstein theorem on equality of cardinals. – Ronnie Brown Oct 29 '20 at 11:23
  • 2
    If being young is correlated with mistakenly thinking that triviality of a proof occurs only when the theorem is trivial, might that not be because "our" pedagogy presents mathematics in that way? Often a theorem and its proof are presented, and then the way in which that theorem fits into the broader landscape is seen ONLY when and if some later course is take in which the theorem is applied. It is obvious to anyone willing to see it that that way of organizing things is the cause of the misconceptions the public has about mathematics, namely:$,\ldots\ldots \qquad$ – Michael Hardy Dec 26 '20 at 22:08
  • 1
    $\ldots\ldots,$that mathematics is done by mechanically applying algorithms, that mathematics is a subject in which everything is already known, that mathematics is boring (even people who've hardly ever thought about this should see that that approach can make it boring), and so on. – Michael Hardy Dec 26 '20 at 22:09

45 Answers45

147

Bertrand Russell proved that the general set-formation principle known as the Comprehension Principle, which asserts that for any property $\varphi$ one may form the set $\lbrace\ x \mid \varphi(x)\ \rbrace$ of all objects having that property, is simply inconsistent.

This theorem, also known as the Russell Paradox, was certainly not obvious at the time, as Frege was famously completing his major treatise on the foundation of mathematics, based principally on what we now call naive set theory, using the Comprehension Principle. It is Russell's theorem that showed that this naive set theory is contradictory.

Nevertheless, the proof of Russell's theorem is trivial: Let $R$ be the set of all sets $x$ such that $x\notin x$. Thus, $R\in R$ if and only if $R\notin R$, a contradiction.

So the proof is trivial, but the theorem was shocking and led to a variety of developments in the foundations of mathematics, from which ultimately the modern ZFC conceptions arose. Frege abandoned his work in this area.

  • 9
    Hi Joel. Frege actually finished the treatise, didn't he? He acknowledged the inconsistency, and attributed the discovery to Russell. (The book was going to press when this happened.) He kept working in logic afterward, and as for the project of reducing mathematics to logic, I do not think he ever abandoned it, or stopped believing that it was possible. – Andrés E. Caicedo Jun 20 '10 at 01:37
  • 7
    Andres, yes he finished it, since it was in press when the contradiction was found, but clearly he had lost heart in it. His famous response to Russell was to write " "Hardly anything more unfortunate can befall a scientific writer than to have one of the foundations of his edifice shaken after the work is finished." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gottlob_Frege Did he go on to do any significant work salvaging it? – Joel David Hamkins Jun 20 '10 at 01:51
  • 1
    You know? I'm not sure. Russell and Whitehead's project overshadowed his. It would be interesting to see whether he had any comments on philosophical issues deriving from the paradox, but I've never located anything, and he died a few years before G"odel's result. – Andrés E. Caicedo Jun 20 '10 at 02:07
  • 1
    I think we may need a philosophical historian to tell us... – Joel David Hamkins Jun 20 '10 at 02:12
  • 8
    I'm not a philosophical historian, but I do know that Frege discovered (what he thought was) a way to fix his theory; it turned out to result in the universe having a single element, which is another contradiction if one assumes, as (if I recall correctly) Frege seems to implicitly, that "true$\not=$false". – Noah Schweber Nov 10 '10 at 05:19
  • I seem to recall that the Russell Paradox was indeed known to Cantor from very early on. I believe Penrose states this bit of history in "The Road To Reality" where he discusses the Cantor slash, but I don't have it at hand. – Selene Routley May 25 '11 at 02:49
  • 13
    According to Gregory Moore's history of the axiom of choice, your description of the paradoxes leading to the development of ZFC is incorrect. I'm not an expert in this area, but by his account Zermelo wasn't particularly troubled by the paradoxes. Zermelo's axiomatisation of set theory was produced to overcome criticism of his claimed solution to the well-ordering problem (in which he stated the axiom of choice and derived the well-ordering of the continuum). Russell's theory of types was clearly based on his concerns about the paradoxes, but (Moore claims that) Zermelo's work was not. – Phil Ellison May 25 '11 at 09:52
  • 1
    A few corrections about Frege’s Grundgesetze, Part I of II. He didn’t finish the work, he merely sent the appropriate number of pages to the printer. The last section of volume II (§245, p. 243) discusses “Die nächste Aufgabe,” “the next problem.” See Dummett’s Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 241; he estimates that Volume II contains only about three quarters of Part III. – Flash Sheridan Sep 01 '11 at 23:14
  • 2
    Part II I believe someone eventually derived a full contradiction from Frege’s hasty Way Out, but I can’t find the reference.
    I think he did genuinely give up, especially on deriving arithmetic from logic. See, for example, his late abortive attempt to derive it from geometry, “A New Attempt at a Foundation for Arithmetic,” in the Posthumous Writings.
    – Flash Sheridan Sep 01 '11 at 23:15
  • 13
    I am not sure what the word "trivial" means here. Surely Russell's proof is "short" but I think it is not "easy to discover". As a reformulation of Cantor's diagonal proof for existence of more than one infinity which is one the most fundamental theorems of mathematics with a creative proof, I think Russell's theorem and its proof are as non-trivial as Cantor's theorem and its diagonal proof. I believe the idea of forming a really unnatural set $X$ of all sets which don't belong to themselves and asking about $X\in X$ is a really complicated idea in its own type and non-trivial in any sense. –  May 09 '14 at 01:10
  • @PhilEllison My remark is quite mild, "led to a variety of developments in the foundations of mathematics, from which ultimately the modern ZFC conceptions arose," which seems accurate, and so I believe your criticism is out of place. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Zermelo specifically mentions the Russell paradox when he introduces his axioms. He says basically that because of the Russell paradox, we can't have the general comprehension principle, and so, he says, he seeks the principles upon which set theory can be successfully founded. – Joel David Hamkins Dec 30 '22 at 13:25
112

The additivity of expected value is absolutely trivial to prove, but (I think) mind-blowing that it is true.

Also, the fact that (finite) sums/products of vector spaces are isomorphic. Extremely easy, but amazingly powerful. It is the reason we can do linear algebra with matrices.

Jeff Strom
  • 12,468
  • 58
    +1 for the linearity of expectation. Even after all these years I still find myself occasionally thinking about some subtle correlations between random variables and (in effect) worrying about whether the correlation affects the expected value, before slapping my forehead and realizing that I'm questioning whether expectation is linear. More than once I've stated the principle to someone who was otherwise quite mathematically sophisticated, and been greeted by a flat refusal to believe that expectation is always linear. – Timothy Chow May 25 '11 at 15:10
  • 11
    I would have to say, though, that additivity of expected value for absolutely integrable random variables on an abstract probability space is not completely trivial to prove, without having gone through all the requisite measure theory... – Terry Tao Jan 23 '15 at 04:38
  • 7
    One of the early delights in reading "Categories for the Working Mathematician" was the realization that any map from a direct sum to a direct product can be represented by a matrix of morphisms. Then the fact you mention, together with linear maps from $\mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ being given by scalar multiplication, gives rise to matrices in the familiar sense. – Steven Gubkin Dec 01 '15 at 16:15
  • 1
    @TerryTao : Sometimes I wonder if measure theory as we know it should be replaced by some sort of measure theory as we don't yet know it, precisely because some of those proofs seem unreasonably hairy. $\qquad$ – Michael Hardy Nov 06 '16 at 21:00
  • 6
    @MichaelHardy The importance of such a theory would be immeasurable! – Akiva Weinberger Dec 06 '16 at 21:43
  • @AkivaWeinberger : No pun intended, I'm sure. – Michael Hardy Dec 06 '16 at 22:06
  • 2
    What I find mindblowing about the linearity of expectation is that it still holds when the variables are neither independent nor identically distributed. For the other cases it's way more plausible. – user541686 Dec 07 '16 at 07:24
  • 7
    A good corollary is Buffon's noodle which becomes almost trivial once you believe expectation is additive, despte being a much stronger result than Buffon's needle which is usually proved in a much harder way. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffon%27s_noodle – Dan Piponi Apr 04 '17 at 00:11
96

A nontrivial geometric theorem of the type you are looking for may be the Desargues theorem:

If two triangles are in perspective then the intersections of their corresponding sides lie on a line.

In three dimensions there is a trivial visual proof:

Desargues
(source: schillerinstitute.org)

But the theorem is nontrivial because there is no projective proof in two dimensions -- there are projective planes in which the theorem does not hold.

The plot thickens when one investigates the algebraic reasons for this. Hilbert discovered that the Desargues theorem is equivalent to associativity of the underlying coordinate system. So, a projective plane with octonion coordinates, for example, does not satisfy the Desargues theorem.

Addendum. In answer to your first question, the quote is a garbled version of Grothendieck, quoting Ronnie Brown quoting J.H.C. Whitehead. I found it on p.188 of the PDF version of Récoltes et Semailles. Translating back into English, it becomes:

... the snobbery of the young, who think that a theorem is trivial because its proof is trivial.

Glorfindel
  • 2,743
  • 7
    So it was Whitehead.

    I found this within "pithypedia":

    It is the snobbishness of the young to suppose that a theorem is trivial because the proof is trivial. --- Henry Whitehead

    – Michael Hardy Jun 21 '10 at 22:01
  • 4
    The picture is a nice illustration of the theorem, but I don't see how it makes the proof trivial. At best, it seems to reduce it to a bunch of motivated calculations, but then, any theorem of this sort can be proved by a bunch of calculations. – Ryan Reich Feb 14 '11 at 16:50
  • 17
    @Ryan: The picture translates directly into a proof from the axioms for a projective space, which say things like "any two planes meet in a unique line." No calculation is needed. Just the opposite in fact: the possibility of calculation follows from the Desargues theorem. It enables one to introduce coordinates and prove that they form a skew field. – John Stillwell Feb 14 '11 at 23:33
  • 2
    This proof is beautiful. – Roland Bacher May 25 '11 at 08:46
  • 2
    This is in no way a criticism, but in case you ever want to reproduce this image somewhere more formal, note the point labelled C is a blackboard bold C. – Cam McLeman May 19 '14 at 18:15
  • 8
    To expand on John Stillwell's reply: the two planes of the triangles intersect in the unique line EF. A'B' and AB intersect, but as A'B' lies in the plane of A'B'C' and AB lies in the plane of ABC, they must be concurrent with that unique line. Therefore all three intersection points lie on the unique line. This proof breaks down in the coplanar case. – Watson Ladd Dec 01 '15 at 11:55
  • 1
    @WatsonLadd So Desargue's theorem is lifted to three dimensions to give a proof. In other words, this proof shows that nonarguesian planes do not embed into threedimensional projective geometries. – Sebastian Goette Dec 02 '15 at 12:19
  • 1
    It seems that ten years later, the link to the beautiful picture proof has disappeared. Does anybody know another source for this image? – David Zhang Sep 23 '20 at 08:31
  • 1
    Thanks for alerting me to the disappearance of the picture. There is a rather similar picture at https://mathworld.wolfram.com/DesarguesTheorem.html – John Stillwell Sep 24 '20 at 00:16
91

Schur's lemma states in its basic version, that the only endomorphisms of a finite dimensional, irreducible representation over an algebraically closed field are scalars.

It is maybe one of the most useful results in representation theory, however its proof fits into a single line:

Each endomorphism has an eigenvalue and eigenspaces are sub-representations.

Jan Weidner
  • 12,846
  • 2
    Excellent example! – Victor Protsak Jun 21 '10 at 00:39
  • 1
    To be honest, Schur's theorem alone is rather helpless - it doesn't tell us why we should care about irreducibles. It is the semisimplicity of so many interesting algebras / the complete reducibility of so many representations that enables us to have some use for Schur's lemma. As for this complete reducibility, it is in itself a good example of a trivially provable nontrivial result (I am talking about Maschke and the invariant Hermitian form). I remember I have been trying to prove Maschke's theorem for a month until I finally gave up and read the 2-lines proof. – darij grinberg 0 secs ago – darij grinberg Jun 21 '10 at 09:52
  • 20
    @darij: au contraire, we should care about the simple objects in any category for which all object have finite length, since that is step 0 of any classification theory. For the infinite-dimensional admissible representations which arise in Lie theory, $p$-adic groups, etc. often semisimplicity fails but finite-length holds, and understanding Ext^1's is quite serious. The version of Schur's Lemma there is also "trivial" to prove (by a trick) and extremely important. So oddly, the importance of Schur's Lemma becomes more apparent when extended to a context for which Maschke's theorem fails! – Boyarsky Jun 21 '10 at 12:11
  • 1
    Is this the proof Dick Palais http://mathoverflow.net/questions/24913/quick-proofs-of-hard-theorems/24927#24927 says that Mackey used, and is it due to Mackey? – Selene Routley May 25 '11 at 02:56
76

Conway, in chapter IV section 3 of Functions of One Complex Variable, after giving a short proof of Liouville's theorem, says:

"The reader should not be deceived into thinking that this theorem is insignificant because it has such a short proof. We have expended a great deal of effort building up machinery and increasing our knowledge of analytic functions. We have plowed, planted, and fertilized; we shouldn't be surprised if, occasionally, something is there for easy picking."

72

I think a lot of basic category theory fits what you've described. For instance, Yoneda's lemma: an object is determined up to unique isomorphism by the corresponding hom-functor. The proof uses nothing more than the definition of a category. But the lemma is really useful. For instance, suppose you want to show that $X \times Y \simeq Y \times X$ functorially in an arbitrary category (i.e. that products are commutative). Clearly this is true in the category of sets. But if $X,Y$ are in a category, then consider the associated functors $\hom(T, X \times Y) = \hom(T,X) \times \hom(T,Y)$ and $\hom(T, Y \times X) = \hom(T,Y) \times \hom(T,X)$. These are naturally isomorphic (by the case of the category of sets) and so by Yoneda, $X \times Y \simeq Y \times X$ in the arbitrary category.

This is a rather uninteresting example (the universal property of products could have been immediately applied), but let's say one wanted to prove that a certain commutative diagram was cartesian, say that $X,T$ are $S$-objects and $X \to T$ is an $S$-morphism, and we want to show that the "graph morphism" $X \to X \times_S T$ is the pull-back of $T \to T \times_S T$ under $X \to T$. One implication of this is that the graph morphism in the category of schemes is a closed immersion when $T$ is separated over $S$ (and an immersion in any case). Here, using Yoneda's lemma to prove the cartesian claim makes life easier.

In addition, things like moduli spaces make no sense at all without it. (I realize moduli spaces are far more important than anything I just said, but I don't know enough to say anything.)

Akhil Mathew
  • 25,291
  • 6
    OK, Yoneda's Lemma is a great example (though your given application is not good, as you say). Something you'll learn if you read Grothendieck's Seminaire Cartan exposes: he always was careful to say the "moduli space" is a pair $(M, \xi)$ with $\xi \in F(M)$, not just $M$ by itself (i.e., $\xi$ encodes a specific isomorphism $F \simeq {\rm{Hom}}(\cdot,M)$). The relevance to your silly examples is that one should not just say that there is "some" isomorphism $X \times Y \simeq Y \times X$ but always make clear what the isomorphism is (i.e., specify its composites with the projections). – Boyarsky Jun 20 '10 at 03:14
  • 17
    +1: Yoneda's Lemma is a fantastic example, maybe even close to optimal. – Pete L. Clark Jun 20 '10 at 07:47
  • 3
    For a more interesting example of an application, here's one of my favourites: the two standard co-algebra structures on $k[x]$. You can write them down and check the equations by hand, which is routine but rather unenlightening. Or you can note that (in $k$-algebras) ${\rm Hom}(k[x],A) \simeq A$, which is naturally a ring, so its two monoid structures (addition and multiplication) must correspond (by Yoneda) to two co-algebra structures on $k[x]$! (And you can chase through the Yoneda argument to see what the structure maps must be, and that they are the usual ones.) – Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine Jun 20 '10 at 09:01
  • 16
    I think I remember a Gower's quote: "Here is something category theorists will like: it's trivial but not trivially trivial" – Steven Gubkin Jun 20 '10 at 12:54
  • 2
    I did say that once, but I was quoting it -- I don't know where it originated. – gowers Jul 27 '10 at 21:11
  • 4
    I think these kind of sayings have been with us for a while. Here's another, similar example, having nothing to do with category theory, and which I heard attributed to George Mackey: he was supposedly lecturing, wrote something down on the board, and said it was obvious. Then he stopped, evidently realizing he didn't know why. He left the room and came back 10 minutes (?) later, and said, "It is obvious. But it's not obvious that it's obvious."

    Did this actually happen? I don't know. But I wouldn't be surprised if this kind of story goes back to the ancient Greeks.

    – Carl Offner Jul 27 '10 at 22:35
  • 11
    Well, the original quote is due to Peter Freyd, and it looks almost opposite to the way it's being recounted above: "Perhaps the purpose of categorical algebra is to show that which is trivial is trivially trivial." That is, category theory aids in making the softer bits of mathematics look utterly natural and obvious, so that one can more easily isolate the harder nuggets and attack them with abandon (I wrote words to this effect on the nLab). This is a tremendous service that category theory provides. – Todd Trimble Jun 19 '11 at 13:08
72

Bayes' theorem follows directly from the definition of conditional probability and yet it is a very subtle result. The theorem may look trivial, but intelligent people frequently make errors that amount to ignoring or misapplying Bayes' theorem.

John D. Cook
  • 5,147
  • 35
    The probabilistic content of Bayes' theorem is trivial. The statistical content is not. – Steve Huntsman Jun 20 '10 at 14:39
  • 7
    @JohnD.Cook : What is called "Bayesian statistics" is essentially statistical inference in which one assigns probabilities to everything that is uncertain, regardless of whether it is random. Thus the proportion of voters who will vote for Donary Clintrump in a sample of $100$ voters will change if you take a different sample of $100$ voters, and for some purposes that it what it means to call that proportion "random". But is there a probability of $0.4$ that there was life on Mars a billion years ago? That is not "random" in that sense: it is not something that holds in $40%\ldots,\qquad$ – Michael Hardy Nov 06 '16 at 21:06
  • 6
    $\ldots,$of all instances. So a Bayesian may assign probability $0.4$ to that proposition about Mars, whereas a frequentist will refuse to do so, for lack of randomness. The debate about the appropriateness of these approaches probably involves all the philosophical questions about inductive inference. It is because of that the the mathematical triviality known as Bayes's theorem is nontrivial. (@SteveHuntsman) $\qquad$ – Michael Hardy Nov 06 '16 at 21:06
71

Cantor proved that the set of real numbers is uncountable---it cannot be put in bijective correspondence with the natural numbers---but the proof is a simple diagonalization: if the real numbers could be put on a list $z_0$, $z_1$, and so on, then design a real number $d$ whose $n$-th digit differs from the $n$-th digit of $z_n$. Thus, $d\neq z_n$ for every $n$, contradiction!

So the proof seems trivial, perhaps especially now that diagonalization is (as a result) a standard proof method, but the theorem nevertheless seems profound. It was even controversial for various reasons at the time, and certainly it opened up a completely new understanding and treatment of infinity in mathematics.

  • 13
    I hesitate to agree with this one. Cantor's original uncountability proof was not a diagonal argument and did not mention digits at all, and the argument that does mention digits relies on the fact that the numeral system actually behaves in certain ways. And if a mathematician in about 1870 had been handed the question of whether there is some sequence that contains all reals, I don't think one would consider it a routine exercise. – Michael Hardy Jun 20 '10 at 01:24
  • 7
    Also, diagonalization gives a trivial proof that transcendental numbers exist -- a result whose first proof (by Liouville) was considerably less trivial. – John Stillwell Jun 20 '10 at 01:25
  • 1
    Michael, my understnanding of the history is that Cantor understood his argument as a diagonalization, but published it as an intersection of closed sets argument as you decribe in order to satisfy prevailing mathematical winds concerning completed infinities and whatnot; in a sense the world was not yet ready for his way of thinking. His later general argument showing that the power set P(X) is larger than X is a direct diagonalization. – Joel David Hamkins Jun 20 '10 at 01:36
  • 1
    Cantor's original paper showing uncountability of the reals was primarily concerned with proving that real transcendental numbers exist. And as I said, it wasn't done by diagonalization.

    But my objection to considering this particular proof trivial is still there.

    – Michael Hardy Jun 20 '10 at 01:36
  • 19
    Well, my view is that the theorem is still profound today and the proof is trivial, however things may have seemed in 1870, and so it seems to be an example of what you requested. – Joel David Hamkins Jun 20 '10 at 02:05
  • 15
    Is this proof really trivial, or is it just that we were all forced to learn it? Is it trivial that there are infinitely many primes? – Ilya Grigoriev Jun 20 '10 at 02:42
  • 1
    @Joel: do you recall a rough reference for that historical context (that Cantor had the diagonal argument before the closed sets one)? I'd be interested to see it!

    @Ilya: I think both the diagonal argument and the infinitude of primes are, at least, "trivial once you see them" - far from trivial to come up with in the first place, but very straightforward to understand, or to explain to somebody - which is surely the kind of "tirival" that's being asked about?

    – Peter LeFanu Lumsdaine Jun 20 '10 at 08:49
  • 9
    The diagonal proof is short and elegant, but I personally don't consider it trivial. – Victor Protsak Jun 21 '10 at 00:32
  • 2
    Yes, perhaps the diagonal method only seems trivial now, because it has permeated all of logic. The essence of the method is to accomplish a list of things by accomplishing the n-th thing on the n-th step of a construction. Isn't this trivial? Cantor's original argument follows this diagonal form, for he omits the n-th real on a given list with the n-th closed set, and then intersects them to find a real not on the list. I find this to be essentially identical to the typical digit argument that one finds in an undergraduate analysis course today. – Joel David Hamkins Jun 21 '10 at 00:54
  • 2
    Michael, to be more explicit, my view is that the original Cantor proof, using intersection of intervals, is fundamentally the same as the usual modern presentation using digits. It is a mere stylistic difference, since restricting the first finitely many digits of a real number is the same as restricting to an interval. Thus, I don't agree with your assertion that Cantor's original argument was not a "diagonal" argument. Rather, I regard it as the very first diagonal argument. – Joel David Hamkins Jun 26 '13 at 16:42
  • 1
    I think the reason I'd consider diagonalization nontrivial is that essentially the same proof shows that the Halting problem is undecidable, yet this is a proof that undergrads often struggle with until they've seen it ~half a dozen times. (The first five times or so it never seems to stick...) But perhaps its use there is/feels more subtle, since you've got Turing machines eating Turing machines, which is a little more meta than lists of digits... – Joshua Grochow May 09 '14 at 01:10
  • Which of Cantor's proofs of the nondenumerability of the continuum is considered "trivial", the one that uses the machinery of decimal expansions, or the one that just uses the completeness of the real line? I haven't read the latter but I'm guessing it uses something like "a bounded increasing sequences converges." – bof Dec 11 '23 at 07:10
47

If $D$ is an at most countably dimensional division algebra over $\mathbb{C}$ then $D=\mathbb{C}.$

Proof Let $x\in D\setminus\mathbb{C},$ then $\{(x-a)^{-1}, a\in\mathbb{C}\}$ is an uncountable linearly independent set. $\square$

This is an algebraic variant of the Gelfand–Mazur theorem and it implies countably-dimensional Schur's Lemma over $\mathbb{C}$ (or any uncountable field).

  • 8
    And it can be used to give a simple proof of the Hilbert Nullstellensatz over $\mathbb C$. – Joël May 08 '14 at 22:35
46

The union bound:

Pr[A or B] ≤ Pr[A] + Pr[B]

for any two events A and B, regardless of their dependence. This is probably the single most trivial-to-prove theorem I know whose explicit formulation I've actually found useful. (Indeed, more than useful: indispensable! There's a huge number of problems in theoretical computer science and combinatorics that are much easier for a beginner to solve if you give the two-word hint "union bound," than if you don't. And one stops being a beginner at roughly the point when one internalizes the "union bound" hint, and starts applying it to every problem one encounters... :-) )

  • 3
    Thumbs up for this answer. Every single paper in Coding Theory uses the "union bound". I remember the first time I read a paper that uses the "union bound". I didn't know the meaning of the expression at that time and had to google it. My reaction was: pff... is THAT the so-called union bound? – Campello Mar 04 '14 at 11:39
  • 5
    In the version that says $\Pr(A_1\cup \cdots\cup A_n) \le \Pr(A_1)+\cdots+\Pr(A_n),$ this is called Bonferroni's inequality. $\qquad$ – Michael Hardy Nov 06 '16 at 21:12
45

Lagrange's Theorem in group theory follows almost straight away from the definition of an equivalence relation. But lots of theorems in finite group theory stem from it in some way.

  • 7
    So should that be taken to express agreement with the guess that the nontriviality would be located in the theorems consequences? – Michael Hardy Jun 20 '10 at 01:20
33

Euclid's proof for the infinitude of prime numbers seems to satisfy your criteria for a trivial proof for a non-trivial theorem.

Theorem. There are more primes than found in any finite list of primes. Proof. Call the primes in our finite list p1, p2, ..., pr. Let P be any common multiple of these primes plus one (for example, P = p1p2...pr+1). Now P is either prime or it is not. If it is prime, then P is a prime that was not in our list. If P is not prime, then it is divisible by some prime, call it p. Notice p can not be any of p1, p2, ..., pr, because all of them leave a remainder of 1 when dividing P. So this prime p is some prime that was not in our original list. Either way, the original list was incomplete.

  • 3
    I know that this is an important theorem but, actually how many results, say in elementary number theory, depend on the fact that there's an infinite number of primes? – Adrian Barquero-Sanchez Jun 20 '10 at 02:45
  • 3
    Perhaps not so much in elementary number theory, but this fact is implicitly used in much of analytic number theory. Of course, this is in some sense begging the question, because many results in analytic number theory are geared towards describing the distribution of primes in the positive integers, which would be elementary should there only be finitely many. – Peter Humphries Jun 20 '10 at 04:06
  • 10
    The Wiles/Taylor-Wiles proof of Fermat's Last Theorem relies crucially at one point on the existence of infinitely many primes, when constructing the auxiliary sets Q_n of primes with certain properties in order to perform the patching argument to prove R=T. More precisely it relies on the Cebotarev density theorem, which says even more---there are infinitely many primes with certain Galois-theoretic properties. – Kevin Buzzard Jun 20 '10 at 06:14
  • 5
    Adrian, it is crucial in many applications that one can choose a prime number that avoids a certain number of bad properties. Typical may be a prime fitting a congruence condition while also not dividing some number. In principle this stuff is settled using Dirichlet's theorem on primes in arithmetic progressions, which is midway between Euclid's raw theorem that there are infinitely many primes and the Chebotarev density theorem that Kevin refers to. For example, the most elementary proof of the Hasse--Minkowski theorem that classifies quadratic forms over Q uses this method in the proof. – KConrad Jun 20 '10 at 06:30
  • 3
    Note that "not dividing some number" is a finite number of bad conditions (i.e., you don't want to pick a prime from among the prime factors of that number), and if you're trying to prove some kind of general theorem then this number whose prime factors you want to avoid selecting typically is some unknown thing and all you can do is say "Well, that mystery number has a finite number of prime factors, so as long as the set of primes fitting the condition I need is infinite I can definitely pick a prime fitting the condition I need which doesn't divide that number." – KConrad Jun 20 '10 at 06:33
  • 11
    Kevin, since your brought up the FLT topic, you'll like this story: so when Wiles was teaching his graduate course on his proof of FLT (the proof that had a gap, not known at that time), at some point he gave an argument which required that some prime not be too small, maybe bigger than 5 or something. Then Faltings said "So this proof doesn't need any primes bigger than 7", which got a big laugh from everyone. – BCnrd Jun 20 '10 at 07:09
  • 7
    @KConrad: indeed, your description hits upon my favorite way of phrasing Euclid's proof. If there were only finitely many primes, then their product, $N$, would be divisible by every prime number and thus would not be relatively prime to any integer greater than $1$. But that's ridiculous: consider $N+1$... – Pete L. Clark Jun 20 '10 at 07:46
  • 1
    Additive combinatorics also often uses the fact that there are infinitely many primes - one wishes to prove something about the finite interval {1,2,...,N} (for any N), and it is often very helpful to be able to embed this interval inside a finite cyclic group. For this, just choose a prime larger than N. – Thomas Bloom Jun 20 '10 at 10:18
  • 1
    As far as I remember, Gauss' first proof of his reciprocity (the obscure induction proof) also needs constructing primes. – darij grinberg Jun 20 '10 at 10:35
  • 4
    In the proof of Serre's conjecture by Khare and Wintenberger, an intriguing induction argument appears that needs something very close to Bertrand's postulate (there is a prime between $n$ and $2n$). – Peter Bruin Jun 20 '10 at 13:39
  • 5
    Thanks a lot you guys. Your replies to my initial comment are great. – Adrian Barquero-Sanchez Jun 20 '10 at 14:23
  • 2
    Thomas, I'm confused—I guess you want something more than cyclicity, because you can embed ${1,\dotsc,N}$ in $\mathbb Z/N\mathbb Z$ without any worries about primality. – LSpice May 25 '11 at 02:18
  • 2
    @spice: a cyclic subgroup of a multiplicative group, one presumes. – Ramsey May 25 '11 at 03:50
  • 2
    Yes, what Ramsey said. It's useful to have multiplicative inverses. – Thomas Bloom May 25 '11 at 08:56
  • 2
    Ah, I see. Of course even this may be got around by using the Euclidean trick and working in $\mathbb Z/(N! + 1)\mathbb Z$, but I guess that re-proving infinitude of primes is no easier than just using it. :-) – LSpice May 25 '11 at 14:01
30

Chebyshev's inequality is the following:

Suppose $X, \mu$ is a measure space, and $f \in L^p(X, \mu)$, then for all $t > 0$

$\mu( \{x \in X : |f(x)| \geq t \} ) \leq \frac{1}{t^p} \|f\|_{L^p(X, \mu)}^p$.

The proof is trivial:

Observe that

$\mu( \{x \in X : |f(x)| \geq t \} )t^p = \int_{X} 1_{|f| \geq t}(x)t^p \leq \int_{X} |f|^p = \|f\|_{L^p(X, \mu)}^p$

and divide both sides by $t^p$.

This is a fundamental inequality in the the study of the interpolation of L^p spaces.

28

Let me add to this long list the famous Nakayama lemma, a crucial result in commutative algebra, and whose original claim is as follows:

Let $(R,\mathfrak m)$ be a local ring and $M$ a finitely generated $R$-module. If $\mathfrak mM=M$ then $M=0$.

Its proof is very simple: consider $x_1,\dots,x_n$ a minimal system of generators; then $x_n=a_1x_1+\cdots+a_nx_n$ with $a_i\in\mathfrak m$, so $(1-a_n)x_n=a_1x_1+\cdots+a_{n-1}x_{n-1}$ and since $1-a_n$ is invertible we get $x_n\in\langle x_1,\dots,x_{n-1}\rangle$, so $x_1,\dots,x_{n-1}$ is a system of generators, a contradiction.

user26857
  • 1,283
27

What about the pigeonhole principle?

ACL
  • 12,762
  • 67
    Some might call that a trivial theorem with a non-trivial proof ... – gowers May 25 '11 at 18:09
  • 5
    Agreed. I don't even know a proof, or where to find one. – Selene Routley May 27 '11 at 03:01
  • 2
    @gowers @Rod, I think it is a good example. Isn't its proof just contraposition? – Quinn Culver Jun 19 '11 at 14:35
  • 15
    One usually proves the pigeonhole principle---in the form of the assertion that there is no injection from a natural number $n$ to a smaller natural number $k$---by induction on $n$. It is clearly true for $n=0$; if true at $n$, and we have an injection of $n+1$ to some smaller $k+1$, then by swapping two points we can produce an injection from $n$ to $k$. It is an interesting result that in very weak formal systems, one can separate the weak pigeonhole principal that there is no injecton from $2n$ to $n$ from the stronger assertion that there is no injection from $n+1$ to $n$. – Joel David Hamkins Jul 24 '13 at 03:41
  • 1
    (ACL, I've protected the question, which is a better solution than your edit, which I will now remove. I will simply lock the answer if the problem persists.) – François G. Dorais May 08 '14 at 21:54
  • @JoelDavidHamkins I recall first hearing of the pigeonhole principle when I was a graduate student. I found it absolutely ridiculous to give something so patently obvious a name, and found it even more absurd to write down a proof. I still feel this way. –  May 17 '17 at 21:08
  • 6
    @Servaes I find it valuable and important to give names to one's fundamental mathematical principles and to understand when they are serving as axioms or whether they are reducible to still more fundamental principles. – Joel David Hamkins May 18 '17 at 10:46
  • 4
    Here's another form of the pigeonhole principle: if $a_1+\cdots+a_n>b_1 + \cdots + b_n$ then $a_i>b_i$ for some $i$. The proof is that the contrapositive is trivial. (The "usual" form of the pigeonhole principle is the case in which $b_i=1$ for all $i$.) – Ira Gessel Dec 26 '20 at 02:43
24

The Chevalley-Warning theorem.

The story goes that the $r=1$ case was conjectured by Artin and given to Ewald Warning as a thesis problem, but when Chevalley visited town he heard it and immediately suggested expanding $f^{q-1}$ and summing over ${\bf F}_q^n$, so Warning's thesis problem became Chevalley's theorem $-$ but Warning recovered by generalizing to $r$ simultaneous equations, so all was well.

(warning [sic]: I can't easily corroborate that Ewald Warning actually wrote his thesis on this result, or indeed completed a doctorate at all; the Mathematics Genealogy Project doesn't show a student of Emil Artin named Ewald Warning, nor indeed does it have any entry for the name Warning. There's an Obituary that might give more information.)

24

How about the theorem that there are two irrational numbers $a$ and $b$ with $a^b$ rational?

Proof. Either $c:=\sqrt{2}^\sqrt{2}$ is rational, or else $c$ is irrational and $c^\sqrt{2}=\sqrt{2}^2=2$ is rational.

Boaz Tsaban
  • 3,104
  • Having never heard of this theorem before, it seems trivial. – Monroe Eskew May 09 '14 at 01:05
  • @MonroeEskew: That's because you saw the proof before trying on your own. Could you provide, for example, an alternative proof not building on deep and technical results? – Boaz Tsaban May 09 '14 at 01:14
  • 1
    Nothing comes to mind. But is this any more than a puzzle with a clever solution? Was this proven before using some deep results, and then someone noticed it had a clever one-line proof? – Monroe Eskew May 09 '14 at 01:29
  • 2
    @MonroeEskew: There is something subtle here: The proof uses the excluded middle principle, which of course I consider valid but Brouwer and the Intuitionistic school do not. I wonder whether this is the first theorem ever that has a large gap between excluded-middle proof and an explicit proof. I also do not know who proved it first this way. It must be a classic. – Boaz Tsaban May 09 '14 at 11:42
  • 1
    If the assertion had been posed as an exercise, I'd have started by thinking about $x\mapsto a^x$ where $a$ is irrational. It's a continuous function, so it has many rational values, i.e. there are many values of $x$ for which $a^x$ is rational. Then there's the problem of showing that some of those $x$-values are irrational. – Michael Hardy May 09 '14 at 16:22
  • 20
    @BoazTsaban There is also a constructive proof: take $a=\sqrt{2}$ and $b=\log_2 (9)$, which are both irrational, but $a^b=3$ is rational – user49822 Jul 23 '14 at 10:13
  • 1
    @user49822 Nice! I was afraid that proving $\log_29$ irrational would be hard, but that's also trivial, so your proof competes well with the dichotomic one. – Boaz Tsaban Jul 23 '14 at 13:39
  • 7
    Along similar prime factorization lines, it's very easy to show that the solution to $x^x = 2$ must be irrational. – Todd Trimble Nov 23 '15 at 19:06
  • 13
    Michael Hardy's proof idea can be made to work as follows. Think about the function $x\mapsto 2^{1/x}$ for $x>0$. This is a monotonic function so for cardinality reasons there is an irrational number $x$ such that $2^{1/x}$ is also irrational. Put $a=2^{1/x}$ and $b=x$. – Sean Eberhard Dec 01 '15 at 09:54
23

M.H. Stone showed in the following paper that a Boolean algebra is nothing but a ring with an identity in which every element is an idempotent. The proof is trivial but the discovery caused a revolution in the theory of Boolean algebras.

Subsumption of the Theory of Boolean Algebras under the Theory of Rings (1935)

Makoto Kato
  • 1,159
  • 3
    Now I am curious. Could you please say something about the content of the revolution in the theory of Boolean Algebras that was caused by the theorem, for someone who knows not too much about the theory of Boolean algebras? –  May 19 '14 at 16:23
  • @rem Stone proved Stone's representation theorem using the aforementioned fact. This theorem has great many applications, e.g. the Stone–Weierstrass theorem and the Stone-Cech compactification. For other applications see for example Stone Spaces by Johnstone and Appendix of the book Boolean Algebras by Sikorski. – Makoto Kato May 19 '14 at 22:10
  • 8
    I once got an email from Gian-Carlo Rota in which he told me that the fact that Boolean algebras are rings had not been very fruitful. I presume he meant not much in the way of research on Boolean algebras resulted from it. But one thing it's useful for is that if you know that something is true of all commutative rings, you don't need to write a separate proof that it's true of Boolean algebras. – Michael Hardy Jul 04 '14 at 03:26
23

What about the irrationality of $\sqrt{2}$, the non-triviality of which is witnessed by the fact that the philosophy of the school of Pythagoreans was based on the belief that such numbers do not exist. The proof, on the other hand, is a well-known elementary one.

  • I disagree that elementary is the same as trivial. If I'm thinking of the same elementary one as you are, it relies on unique factorization, whose proof is not trivial. – Ryan Reich May 24 '11 at 23:19
  • Does it really require unique factorization, or only a special case of unique factorization whose proof might be a lot simpler? – Michael Hardy May 25 '11 at 01:40
  • 2
    I think that it only requires the fact that every integer is even or odd, and a very weak form of infinite descent: If $\sqrt2 = a/b$, then we may factor out all common $2$'s (there's the infinite descent) so that not both $a$ and $b$ are even. Then $\Rightarrow$ $a^2 = 2b^2$ $\overset\Rightarrow$ $a = 2k$ $\Rightarrow$ $b^2 = 2k^2$ $\overset\Rightarrow$ $b = 2\ell$, where the ($*$)'s indicate steps requiring the even–odd dichotomy. – LSpice May 25 '11 at 02:24
  • I must have been thinking of the generalization about UFDs being integrally closed (too much education...). – Ryan Reich May 25 '11 at 02:53
  • 17
    On the same lines, the proof of irrationality of the golden ratio: If $x=1+1/x$ and $x=p/q$ with positive integers $p>q$, then also $x=q/(p−q)$, so there is no minimal fraction for x. – Pietro Majer May 25 '11 at 10:05
  • 12
    The proof of the irrationality of $\sqrt{2}$ can also be done by a method similar to what Pietro Majer proposes for the golden ratio. Assume $n/m = \sqrt{2}$ and this is in lowest terms. Then $(2m-n)/(n-m) = \sqrt{2}$, but this is in still lower terms, so there's a contradiction. – Michael Hardy Jun 21 '11 at 23:49
22

I think Akhil may be right. I believe Grothendieck did say something along the lines of this quote, specifically in reference to Belyi's Theorem . My recollection is that Belyi proved this theorem without knowing that Grothendieck was interested in it, and in working out his theory of Dessin D'Enfants, Grothendieck found he needed this result, but couldn't prove it. He then discovered that Belyi had given a rather elementary proof (I'll hesitate to call it trivial myself, since I recall finding it pretty clever).

If anyone has a copy of Grothendieck's Esquisse D'un Programme, maybe the specific quote is in there? I don't seem to have an English copy on my laptop, and all of Grothendieck's writing has been removed from the Grothendieck Circle's webpage per Grothendieck's request. (Interestingly, Wikipedia says this request was made in a letter to Illusie in January 2010.) I don't immediately see such a quote in the French version.

Edit: Here is the English translation of a relevant passage from Esquisse d'un Programme due to Leila Schneps and Pierre Lochak, as it appears in London Math. Soc. Lecture Notes Series vol. 242 (pp. 254-255; around page 15 on Grothendieck's typewritten manuscript):

Every finite oriented map gives rise to a projective non-singular algebraic curve defined over $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$, and one immediately asks the question: which are the algebraic curves over $\overline{\mathbb{Q}}$ obtained in this way -- do we obtain them all, who knows? In more erudite terms, could it be true that every projective non-singular algebraic curve defined over a number field occurs as a possible "modular curve" parametrising elliptic curves equipped with a suitable rigidification? Such a supposition seemed so crazy that I was almost embarrassed to submit it to the competent people in the domain. Deligne when I consulted him found it crazy indeed, but didn't have any counterexample up his sleeve. Less than a year later, at the International Congress in Helsinki, the Soviet mathematician Bielyi announced exactly that result, with a proof of disconcerting simplicity which fit into two little pages of a letter of Deligne -- never, without a doubt, was such a deep and disconcerting result proved in so few lines!

In the form in which Bielyi states it, his result essentially says that every algebraic curve defined over a number field can be obtained as a covering of the projective line ramified over the points $0, 1$ and $\infty$. This result seems to have remained more or less unobserved. Yet it appears to me to have considerable importance. To me, its essential message is that there is a profound identity between the combinatorics of finite maps on the one hand, and the geometry of algebraic curves defined over number fields on the other. This deep result, together with the algebraic-geometric interpretation of maps, opens the door onto a new, unexplored world -- within reach of all, who pass by without seeing it.

Dan Ramras
  • 8,498
18

Stokes' theorem is certainly important, but it's proof is very easy: it essentially reduces (by a standard partition-of-unity argument) to the case where the compact manifold-with-boundary is a half-space, and then the definitions show that it is just the fundamental theorem of calculus.

Akhil Mathew
  • 25,291
  • Hm. Maybe I'm not remembering the proof I learned correctly then (or I missed something then). – Akhil Mathew Jun 20 '10 at 02:42
  • 15
    You may be thinking of the proof of the generalized Stokes theorem for differential forms ($\int_M d\omega=\int_{\partial M}\omega$), in which a partition of unity reduces the proof to the case where $M$ is a half space and $\omega$ has compact support – a case where the theorem becomes trivial indeed. But due to the need for partitions of unity and good coordinate choices, I don't agree that the proof can be called trivial. – Harald Hanche-Olsen Jun 20 '10 at 02:58
  • The original Stokes theorem is a whole different kettle of fish. But if you parametrize the surface and organize your calculations carefully, you can reduce it to the two-dimensional Green's theorem in a page or so. I've presented this to good calculus students, but am not sure if they got it (or appreciated it even). – Harald Hanche-Olsen Jun 20 '10 at 03:01
  • Yes, that's the one. My mistake; I'll edit the post to change cubes to half-spaces. – Akhil Mathew Jun 20 '10 at 03:22
  • 4
    If a non-trivial result seems to be proved by a trivial method, then the work has likely been shifted elsewhere or missed. In the present circumstances, what you slipped under the rug is justification of methods of computing these integrals, illustrated by the fact that global coordinates on the plane don't restrict to local coordinates used in the definition of integration on the closed unit disc as a 2-manifold with boundary (e.g., the circle isn't locally the zero locus of either coordinate). This ties in with Harald's comments. To patch it needs nothing deep, but does require work. – Boyarsky Jun 20 '10 at 03:39
  • 14
    One of the origins of Bourbaki: no rigorous proof of Stokes' theorem could be found in contemporary books. – Victor Protsak Jun 21 '10 at 00:41
  • @Akhil: it's more of a contextual "what is the proof" issue. The lines that you see in a textbook concerning the proof misses the historical build-up to the writing-down of those lines. In a historical sense, the proof (in any generality) was quite difficult, involving the creation of a lot of formalism. What you see in a textbook is the heavily smoothed-over aftermath, where all the details have been sorted out well-before the theorem is stated. – Ryan Budney May 25 '11 at 05:58
  • 13
    Michael Spivak discusses this precise example in his "Calculus on Manifolds": "There are good reasons why theorems should all be easy and the definitions hard ... Definitions serve a twofold purpose: they are rigorous replacements for vague notions, and machinery for elegant proofs ... Stokes' Theorem shares three important attributes with many fully evolved major theorems: (1) It is trivial. (2) It is trivial because the terms appearing in it have been properly defined. (3) It has significant consequences." – John Sidles May 25 '11 at 12:50
17

Diagram chasing gives an entire class of examples of nontrivial theorems with trivial proofs.

  • 25
    I think the claim that proofs by diagram chasing are trivial needs justification. Recently I watched an excellent mathematician try to prove something by diagram chasing (on the blackboard, in the middle of a class). He tried briefly, failed, and then gave up, instead assigning it as homework. I agree that diagram chasing arguments do not feel very deep (or very interesting), but that's not the same thing as trivial...is it? – Pete L. Clark Jun 20 '10 at 07:54
  • 1
    The best I can do is this: http://mathoverflow.net/questions/9930/algorithm-or-theory-of-diagram-chasing – Steve Huntsman Jun 20 '10 at 11:52
16

Proofs of identities in line with the book A=B (Petkovsek, Wilf & Zeilberger) are trivial - they amount to simple computation. However, the theorems are certainly non-trivial. It is possibly hard to find the right "Ansatz", and you need a computer to find the certificate, but checking the certificate is trivial.

Martin Rubey
  • 5,563
16

If ${n \choose k} < 2^{k(k-1)/2-1}$, then there exists a 2-coloring of the edges of the complete graph on $n$ vertices with no monochromatic $k$-clique.

Proof: Color randomly and the expected number of monochromatic $k$-cliques is smaller than 1.

  • Nice. How good an estimate does it give? For k=3, n = 4 seems to be the upper limit guaranteed by the inequality, where as a 2-coloring exists for n=5. Similarly for k=4 I would hope for such colorings for n larger than the guaranteed 7 given by the inequality. Gerhard "Ask Me About System Design" Paseman, 2011.05.25 – Gerhard Paseman May 25 '11 at 08:01
  • 3
    Gerhard, these so-called Ramsey numbers are notoriously hard to compute. I don't have the latest news on the subject, but the lower and upper bounds on $n$ are very roughly $\sqrt{2}^k$ and $4^k$ respectively (the lower one coming from this "trivial" proof by Erdös from 1947), and improving on either the $\sqrt{2}$ or the 4 is a famous open problem. – Johan Wästlund May 25 '11 at 10:18
  • 1
    @Gerhard: Although Johan is right about the difficulty of computing these Ramsey numbers, the particular one you mentioned, for $k=4$, is known. Take the complete graph whose vertices are the elements of the 17-element field, and color edges according to whether their endpoints differ by a square. This has no monochromatic 4-clique. But every 2-coloring of the edges of the complete graph on 18 vertices has a monochromatic 4-clique. (I believe the problem for $k=5$ remains open, though rather tight bounds are known. For larger $k$ things get really bad.) – Andreas Blass May 25 '11 at 13:09
12

Here is what Grothendieck says in Recoltes et semailles.

Dans le cas cohérent, la démonstration du théorème de bidualité est d’ailleurs triviale. Cela n’empêche que c’est ce que j’appelle sans hésitation un théorème profond”, car il donne une vision simple et profonde de choses qui ne sont pas comprises sans lui. (Voir à ce sujet l’observation de J. H. C. Whitehead sur “le snobisme des jeunes, qui croient qu’un théorème est trivial, parce que sa démonstration est triviale”, observation que je reprends et sur laquelle je brode dans la note “Le snobisme des jeunes — ou les défenseurs de la pureté”, n◦27).

May be someone who has the english version can provide a translation. This is note 947, page 763 in the French pdf version, a search for the word biduality should find it quickly.

So, in short, the biduality theorem is a profound theorem with a trivial proof in the coherent case. And the quote you are referring to is probably due to Whitehead.

coudy
  • 18,537
  • 5
  • 74
  • 134
  • So maybe J.H.C. Whitehead is the answer to my first question. (?) – Michael Hardy Jun 20 '10 at 16:20
  • 9
    Well, with all due respect, I beg to differ with A.G. on this one. Whether in the coherent or etale cases I think that to call the proof of the bi-duality theorem trivial is seriously misleading to anyone who has not gone through the proof (especially if to prove the result in a form which can be used in examples). It's a good example of calling something "trivial" because all of the gigantic effort went into setting up the foundations to make the "trivial" proof. One could likewise call Grothendieck-Riemann-Roch trivial... – BCnrd Jun 20 '10 at 18:38
  • 2
    Grothendieck duality: trivial and profound at the same time. – Victor Protsak Jun 21 '10 at 00:30
10

Poincare Recurrence Theorem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poincar%C3%A9_recurrence_theorem

Let $(X,\Sigma,m)$ be a finite measure space and let $f:X \to X$ be a measure-preserving map. If $E \in \Sigma$, then almost every point in $E$ returns to $E$; i.e., $m (\{x \in E: \exists N: \forall n>N \quad f^n(x) \not \in E \})=0$

A proof can be found e.g. in Arnold's "Mechanics"; there are some on PlanetMath, too. All use basically the definition of a measure, and maybe (or not) a necessary condition for convergence of a series of real numbers.

The theorem describes behavior of certain systems in statistical mechanics or thermodynamics, but it also has many mathematical consequences. It was one of first results in ergodic theory. It can be used to prove e.g. that an orbit of an irrational rotation of a circle is dense. Relations with recent developments in ergodic theory and dynamical systems are discussed by Barreira, doi:10.1142/9789812704016_0039.

  • Does the nontriviality of this theorem reside in the fact that it has many mathematical consequences? (Could it be that if a theorem is nontrivial, the nontriviality is either in its proof or in its consequences?) – Michael Hardy Jun 19 '11 at 15:36
  • Poincare recurrence is a manifestation of the pigeonhole principle, which has made many appearances in this thread! – pre-kidney Feb 14 '16 at 05:10
9

The number of partitions of $n$ into $m$ parts is equal to the number of partitions of $n$ into parts, the largest of which is $m$.
This can be proved if we read at a graph which represents a partition of $n$ vertically.

7

Here was a progression of elegant short proofs, with an increasing content:

  1. M.Mather, Counting homotopy types of manifolds. Topology 4 (1965), 93-94.
  2. James M. Kister, Homotopy types of ANR's. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 19 (1968), 195.
  3. Włodzimierz Holsztyński, A remark on homotopy and category domination. Michigan Math. J. Volume 18, Issue 4 (1971), 409.

The last one was trivial.

7

This is a comment to Sunil's answer on Euclid's proof of the infinitude of primes but I don't have enough point to leave a comment.

There is a generalization of Euclid's proof which should be well known but I seldom see it mentioned. If $a_1,\ldots,a_r$ are pairwise relatively prime integers, then for any subset $I \subset \{1,\ldots,r\}$, $a_{r+1}=\prod_{i \in I}a_i +\prod_{i \not\in I}a_i$ is relatively prime to all the $a_1,\ldots,a_r$.

Michael Hardy
  • 11,922
  • 11
  • 81
  • 119
Chua KS
  • 487
6

The finite intersection property: If $C_\alpha$ (for $\alpha\in I$) are closed subsets in a compact space, and every finite intersection of $C_\alpha$-s is nonempty, then the whole intersection $\bigcap_{\alpha\in I}C_\alpha$ is nonempty.

Proof. Otherwise, the complement $\bigcup_{\alpha\in I}C_\alpha^c$ is an open cover of the space without a finite subcover.

You may prefer the version with the $C_\alpha$-s compact and no assumption on the space containing them, but this is the same since we can intersect all $C_\alpha$-s with some fixed $C_{\alpha_0}$.

To me, it is surprising that this trivial proof gives such a useful assertion.

One may argue that this boils down to De Morgan's Laws, which are also trivial but very useful!

Boaz Tsaban
  • 3,104
6

I have looked through the answers but haven't come across Cantor's theorem, that the there is no surjection from a set $M$ on its power set $P(M)$.

I don't know whether the proof should be considered trivial, but it is short and easy to understand. The assumption of a surjection $f\colon M\rightarrow P(M)$ leads to the contradictory set $A_f:=\{m\in M\colon m\not\in f(m)\}$, the contradiction being $A_f\in A_f\longleftrightarrow A_f\not\in A_f$.

The implication of the theorem is that there is no "largest" set/infinitude!

  • 1
    Actually, Joel David Hamkins already gave this answer. (Technically he only gave the answer for the powerset of the naturals versus the naturals, but the proof is identical to the general case.) – Noah Schweber Jan 24 '17 at 20:55
  • In his first answer he addressed Russell's antinomy, didn't he? And didn't he show in his second answer that the interval (0,1) of reals is uncountable, not the power set of the natural numbers? – Joel Adler Jan 25 '17 at 16:06
  • Yes, but $(0,1)$ is immediately in bijection with $2^\mathbb{N}$; I wouldn't consider that a nontrivial fact. IMO the two results are "morally equivalent." (Of course, that's not a very strong opinion - I didn't downvote! I'm just saying the statement has arguably appeared already.) – Noah Schweber Jan 25 '17 at 16:09
  • I agree that the statement for the special case $\mathcal{N}$ has appeared already. But properties of the real numbers were used in its proof, and the general statement $|M|<|P(M)|$ does not follow. – Joel Adler Jan 26 '17 at 10:49
6

The diamond lemma, a.k.a. Newman's lemma, which says that a terminating system is globally confluent if and only if it is locally confluent, has a very simple proof based on Noetherian induction. This proof was first published by Gérard Huet in 1980; see the Wikipedia article.

But this lemma has many nontrivial applications and, somewhat like the example of linearity of expectation mentioned elsewhere, it can often seem amazing that the possibly very complicated ways in which paths can diverge is irrelevant as long as local steps can be corrected.

Sam Hopkins
  • 22,785
6

I like the Connectedness argument, which follows straight from the axioms of a topology. A topological space $\left(\mathbf{X},\,\mathcal{T}\right)$ is connected iff $\mathbf{X}$ and $\emptyset$ are the only members of $\mathcal{T}$ which are both open and closed at once. $\mathbf{A} \subset \mathbf{X}$ is both open and closed iff its complement $\mathbf{X} \sim \mathbf{A}$ is also both open and closed, thus $\mathbf{X} = \mathbf{A} \bigcup \left(\mathbf{X} \sim \mathbf{A}\right)$ is not a union of disjoint open sets iff either $\mathbf{A} = \emptyset$ or $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{X}$.

It is main idea in "the" (I don't know of any others) proof that a connected topological group $\left(\mathfrak{G},\,\bullet\right)$ is generated by any neighbourhood $\mathbf{N}$ of the group's identity $e$, i.e. $\mathfrak{G} = \bigcup\limits_{k=1}^\infty \mathbf{N}^k$. Intuitively: you can't have a valid "neighbourhood" in the connected topological space without its containing "enough inverses" of its members to generate the whole group in this way.

For completeness, the proof runs: We consider the entity $\mathbf{Y} = \bigcup\limits_{k=1}^\infty \mathbf{N}^k$. For any $\gamma \in \mathbf{Y}$ the map $f_{\gamma} : \mathbf{Y} \to \mathbf{Y}; f_{\gamma}(x) = \gamma^{-1} x$ is continuous, thus $f_{\gamma}^{-1}\left(\mathbf{N}\right) = \gamma \, \mathbf{N}$ contains an open neighbourhood $\mathbf{O}_{\gamma} \subseteq \mathbf{N}$ of $\gamma$, thus $\mathbf{Z} = \bigcup\limits_{\gamma \in \mathbf{Y}} \mathbf{O}_{\gamma}$ is open. Certainly $\mathbf{Y} \subseteq \mathbf{Z}$, but, since $\mathbf{Y}$ is the collection of all products of a finite number of members of $\mathbf{N}$, we have $\mathbf{Z} \subseteq \mathbf{Y}$, thus $\mathbf{Z} = \mathbf{Y}$ is open. If we repeat the above reasoning for members of the set $\mathbf{X} \sim \mathbf{Y}$, we find that the complement of $\mathbf{Y}$ is also open, thus $\mathbf{Y}$, being both open and closed, must be the whole (connected) space $\mathfrak{G}$.

The above is one of my favourite proofs of all time, up there in my favourite thoughts with Beethoven's ninth and Bangles "Walk Like an Egyptian" (or anything by Captain Sensible) and it all hinges on the connectedness argument. It is extremely simple, (not trivial, so it itself doesn't count for the Wiki, sadly) and its result unexpected and interesting: you can't define a neighbourhood without including enough inverses. This is an example of "homogeneity" at work: throwing the group axioms into another set of axioms makes a strong brew and tends to be the mathematical analogue of turfing a kilogram chunk of native sodium into a bucket of water: the group operation tends to clone structure throughout the whole space, thus not many axiom systems can withstand this assault by this cloning process and be consistent. When all the bubbling, fizzing, toiling and trouble is over, only very special systems can be left, thus all kinds of unforeseen results are forced by homogeneity, and the above is a very excitingly typical one.

Fred Daniel Kline
  • 1,041
  • 2
  • 12
  • 34
  • Wonderful answer. – Arrow Dec 08 '15 at 14:14
  • @Arrow Thanks. I can recall being a little bothered by the proof of a topological group's being generated by any neighborhood when I first saw it in Sagle and Wade "Introduction to Lie Groups and Lie Algebras" many years ago. It was so unexpected simple and clear that I mistrusted it! (understanding something at depth at very first reading doesn't happen all that often to me). It was only some years later - maybe ten or so - that I suddenly realized that the "cloning" of local structure that happens by dent of translation is what makes things so "rigid" and a topological group so specialized. – Selene Routley Dec 09 '15 at 05:27
5

Many theorems of finite group theory have such nature: they are non-trivial but their proofs are not so hard. But in the frame of infinite groups or finite loops, those are challenging problems. Below are some example:

1- a finite group with just two conjugacy classes is $\mathbb{Z}_2$.

2- a non-trivial finite $p$-group has non-trivial center.

3- finite groups have Lagrange property.

4- a finite group in which its all nontrivial proper subgroup have order a fixed prime $p$ has order $p^2$ and so is abelian.

Many theorems of finite dimensional vector spaces are also non-trivial with trivial proofs: the similar theorems are not true for modules or infinite dimensional cases or have hard proofs.

Sh.M1972
  • 2,183
5

The Nielsen-Schreier Theorem : a subgroup of a free group is a free group.

The algebraic proofs are rather complicated, whereas the topological proof is trivial : a group is free if and only if it acts freely on a simplicial tree.

Of course the theory of covering spaces and fundamental groups is hidden somewhere.

Thomas
  • 411
  • 6
  • 8
5

The ultimate example that I know of is the Central Limit Theorem, described by Tijms as ``the unofficial sovereign of probability theory''. Incidentally, its significance took time to sink in- it has been forgotten and reproved repeatedly throughout its history.

Classical CLT: Given iid random variables $X_1,X_2,\ldots$ of mean $0$ and variance $1$, the sequence of random variables $\frac{X_1+X_2+\cdots+ X_n}{\sqrt{n}}$ converges in distribution to a normal random variable with mean $0$ and variance $1$.

The proof just Taylor's theorem and the definition of the exponential function (and Lévy's continuity theorem to confirm that the trivial proof indeed implies the theorem statement):

Proof: The Taylor expansion of the characteristic function $Ee^{itX}$ is: $1-t^2/2+o(t^2)$. Plugging in, the characteristic function of $\frac{X_1+X_2+\cdots+X_n}{\sqrt{n}}$ is $\left(1-t^2/2n+o(t^2/n)\right)^n$ which converges to $e^{-t^2/2}$. By Lévy's continuity theorem, convergence of characteristic functions implies convergence in distribution.QED
Michael Hardy
  • 11,922
  • 11
  • 81
  • 119
4

$$ \int u\,dv = uv - \int v \, du. $$ The whole theory of generalized functions follows, as do lots of other things.

Michael Hardy
  • 11,922
  • 11
  • 81
  • 119
  • Someone down-voted this. Can someone explain why? – Michael Hardy Dec 01 '15 at 17:22
  • In fact, three have downvoted it, two have upvoted, currently. – Gerry Myerson Dec 01 '15 at 22:33
  • @GerryMyerson : $\ldots$ and they haven't explained why. ${}\qquad{}$ – Michael Hardy Dec 02 '15 at 00:16
  • 6
    I downvoted it because I thought it was a wild exaggeration. – Todd Trimble Dec 02 '15 at 03:49
  • @ToddTrimble : I suspect you don't mean that it's wildly exaggerated to think that the proof is trivial. Would you dispute the claim that integration by parts is the foundation of the theory of generalized functions? ${}\qquad{}$ – Michael Hardy Dec 02 '15 at 20:10
  • 2
    The principle of integration by parts occurs frequently and all over the place, no question about it, just as does, for example, completing the square or polarization identities, etc. etc. And it occurs in widely varying contexts. But the formula itself doesn't foreshadow all the objects or all the contexts to which it might apply, which vary in sophistication. So, if you say "the whole theory of generalized functions [distributions] follows", then I say no way, that's a wild exaggeration. Does some manifestation of it play an important role there? Of course! – Todd Trimble Dec 02 '15 at 21:26
  • 8
    Yet this seems to me a very nontrivial and important theorem with a trivial proof. – Pietro Majer Apr 04 '17 at 07:44
  • 1
    https://mathoverflow.net/posts/60908/revisions "When Peter Lax went to receive the national medal of science, he was asked by the other recipients about his merits. His answer was (apocryph) I integrated by parts." – Gerry Myerson Dec 26 '20 at 01:45
  • Now eight upvotes, and five downvotes. Fibonacci lives! – Gerry Myerson Nov 08 '22 at 22:44
4

My personal favorite is the Noether-Deuring theorem.

Let $K \subseteq L$ be fields with $L$ of finite dimension over $K$, $R$ a finite-dimensional algebra over $K$. Then $L \otimes R$ is naturally an algebra over $L$, thought of as "extending $R$ by scalars in $L$".

Let $U, V$ be finite-dimensional modules over $R$; then $L\otimes U$ and $L \otimes V$ are modules over $L \otimes R$. Obviously, any isomorphism between $U$ and $V$ as $R$-modules can be extended to an isomorphism between $L\otimes U$ and $L \otimes V$ as $L \otimes R$-modules.

Therefore, if $U \simeq V \in R\text{-mod}$, then $L \otimes U \simeq L \otimes V \in L \otimes R\text{-mod}$.

The Noether-Deuring theorem is that the converse is true. That is, if $L \otimes U \simeq L \otimes V \in L \otimes R\text{-mod}$, then $U \simeq V \in R\text{-mod}$.

Proof: If $L \otimes U \simeq L \otimes V \in L \otimes R\text{-mod}$, then it is also true in $R\text{-mod}$. But there, $L \otimes U \simeq U^n$, where $n = [L: K]$. Therefore, $U^n \simeq V^n \in R\text{-mod}$. By Krull-Schmidt, this is enough to show that $U \simeq V \in R\text{-mod}$.

Note that this isomorphism isn't natural; in order to get a natural choice of isomorphism, "descent data" is needed. But it's surprising that even without that "descent data", there is some isomorphism.

Michael Hardy
  • 11,922
  • 11
  • 81
  • 119
user44191
  • 4,961
  • 1
    The posting repeatedly referred to $R-\text{mod},$ coded as R-\text{mod}. I changed all of them to $R\text{-mod},$ coded as R\text{-mod}. Obviously there is a difference between a hyphen and a minus sign. – Michael Hardy Dec 11 '23 at 06:31
3

I am surprised that no one has mentioned Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein Theorem. It certainly is a non-trivial theorem until you see it for the first time. The proof I linked here, I believe, could be considered a trivial one if you draw "the picture" and observe how the constructed bijection maps the elements.

Another example could be Łoś's theorem. The proof is basically going through definition of ultraproducts and carrying out an induction on formulas. It is tedious to write down but at its core a trivial one. Though, I am reluctant to call the theorem itself trivial!

Burak
  • 4,135
  • 13
    I agree about Łoś's theorem, but not the Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein Theorem. The latter seems like the opposite: The theorem is a trivial "squeeze theorem" about cardinal numbers, but it took 3 guys to get a correct proof. The proof is not that long, but it's clever and IMHO not "trivial." – Monroe Eskew May 09 '14 at 01:19
3

Farkas's Lemma and a variety of other theorems of alternatives are fundamental in the theory of optimization. The proof simply couples the Fundamental Theorem of Linear Algebra with the fact that a positive vector and a (nonzero) nonnegative vector in Euclidean space cannot be orthogonal.

Yoav Kallus
  • 5,926
2

What about Zermelo's Theorem?

Every finite game of perfect information with no tie is determined.

Proof. $$ \exists x_1\forall y_1\dots\exists x_n\forall y_n A\vee\forall x_1\exists y_1\dots\forall x_n\exists y_n\neg A $$ where $A$ states that a final position is reached where player 1 wins.

Xi Li
  • 29
0

The theorem that differential generalized cohomology is characterized by a differential cohomology exact hexagon -- originally asked/conjectured generally and proven for the ordinary case by (Simons-Sullivan 07) -- turns out to follow formally "by stable cohesion" (Bunke-Nikolaus-Völkl 13). A quick review is here: ncatlab.org/schreiber/show/IHP14.

Urs Schreiber
  • 19,564
0

The proof that the deRham cohomology is equivalent to singular cohomology on a smooth manifold is in some sense trivial: one shows that the de Rham complex is a soft (hence cohomologically trivial) resolution of the constant sheaf, and it is not too hard to show that the cohomology of the constant sheaf is the same as singular cohomology. In a sense, it just follows from "abstract nonsense" about derived functors being computable from acyclic resolutions and the fact that soft resolutions are acyclic (a partition of unity argument). But it is certainly a nontrivial theorem.

Akhil Mathew
  • 25,291
  • 6
    So the proof of Serre's GAGA theorems is trivial, granting analytic and algebraic finiteness and ampleness theorems. The proof of Mordell-Weil is trivial, granting the theory of abelian varieties, height functions, and general finiteness theorems of Galois cohomology. If one does the hard foundational work beforehand, then yes, what remains is trivial. To make the deRham theorem useful, we need properties of the isomorphism. So a test: can you prove the integration map trivialization of top-degree cohomology on a compact oriented manifold matches the one defined in singular cohomology? – Boyarsky Jun 20 '10 at 02:51
  • 1
    Unfortunately not, because I know nothing about singular cohomology. – Akhil Mathew Jun 20 '10 at 03:26
  • 4
    Akhil, no worries: now you have a good exercise to keep in mind as you learn more about singular cohomology. You probably won't find it proved in any book (I never did), but eventually you'll figure it out for yourself. At least it gives you more appreciation for the subtlety of the deRham isomorphism. (By the way, the compatibility with cup products is another good one, but that is elegantly handled in Godement's sheaf theory book via "general nonsense" with pairings of resolutions.) There's also the matter of cohomology with compact supports... – Boyarsky Jun 20 '10 at 03:44
  • 3
    Wow, I thought I was the only person in the world who learned sheaf cohomology before learning any other type of cohomology theory! I remember that the first diagram I ever chased was the diagram giving the long exact sequence in cohomology associated to a short exact sequence of sheaves (my teacher told me that it would be more instructive to prove it by myself ). – Andy Putman Jun 20 '10 at 19:22
  • 1
    Yeah, I never really found a book on algebraic topology that I could understand (I've heard Munkres is good, but I won't have access to a library containing it until about a week). By contrast, sheaves seemed rather intuitive, and I've looked at a few differential geometry books that talk about things like Poincare duality from the de Rham viewpoint, but never connecting it to the singular one. I ought to look at Godement's book sometime... – Akhil Mathew Jun 20 '10 at 22:56
  • 2
    Akhil, the book of Greenberg & Harper is short & sweet (with nice exercises). Their discussion of orientation is curious since use an "orientation sheaf" but don't have the general notion of sheaf and so get stuck in some contortions. Anyway, you can get a .djvu file of Munkres' book from our Russian friends at http://extracoder.com/genesis/0072.html (look for item 72583 in the numbering of the left column). And .djvu of Greenberg & Harper is at http://rapiddigger.com/download/greenberg-m-j-harper-j-r-algebraic-topology-a-first-course-djvu-9190699/ – Boyarsky Jun 21 '10 at 03:27
  • Thanks! I've looked through Greenberg and Harper (and actually own a copy) but always found it too terse to really understand what was going on (but that was admittedly a while back). At any rate, though, I fully intend to actually take a course on the subject next fall, so I'll pick it up eventually. – Akhil Mathew Jun 21 '10 at 16:03
  • If you find the book too hard to understand on your own, it sounds like you're not ready for the course. Why not take another stab at reading it, and just do it at your own pace? – Boyarsky Jun 22 '10 at 01:36
  • I'm planning to do that over the summer. There's another course on general and algebraic topology that I could take, but it seemed that I'd get more out of this one (since the more elementary one only goes up to fundamental groups). – Akhil Mathew Jun 22 '10 at 01:50
0

Though a proof may be trivial that doesn't mean it was trivial to find it in the first place !

Euler's Rotation Theorem of elementary Euclidean Geometry (which states that for any arbitrary rigid motion of a sphere about its center there exists a diameter of the sphere (the 'Euler Axis') and axial rotation about it which results in the same net displacement) is not a trivial statement, but it does have a very simple proof based on the following diagram :

enter image description here

The proof consists simply of :

The desired rigid motion can be performed by a succession of two $180^{\circ}$ axial rotations, namely (1) $180^{\circ}$ about whichever of the horizontal axis $L$ and vertical axis $M$ overlays the great circle upon itself upside down, and (2) a $180^{\circ}$ axial rotation which then rectifies the great circle to its correct final position. Hence etc.

Like the theorem itself the supporting statements relied upon in the above proof are trivial to prove, but unlike the theorem they are intuitively obvious :

  1. the final end result of a rigid motion of a sphere about its center has been attained once any great circle has been placed in its correct final position

  2. if by such a motion a great circle on a sphere has been overlayed upon itself upside down in any manner then it can be rectified to its original position by a single $180^{\circ}$ axial rotation about one of its diameters

  3. a succession of two $180^{\circ}$ axial rotations about respective axes is equivalent to a single axial rotation of some angle, namely about the polar axis of the plane containing the two axes

The above proof along with another longer one was originally posted in this answer to Euler's rotation theorem revisited - Elementary geometric proofs.

An article about this topic, Elementary Geometric Proofs Of Euler’s Rotation Theorem, is also posted here.

David Roberts
  • 33,851
-1

Preliminary content

Suppose that $\alpha$ is an ordinal. A rank-into-rank embedding is an elementary embedding $j:(V_{\alpha},\in)\rightarrow(V_{\alpha},\in)$.

The $n$-th classical Laver table is the unique algebraic structure $A_{n}=(\{1,\dots,2^{n}-1,2^{n}\},*)$ such that

  1. $x*(y*z)=(x*y)*(x*z)$, and

  2. $x*1=x+1\mod 2^{n}$

whenever $x,y,z\in\{1,\dots,2^{n}-1,2^{n}\}$.

From a single non-identity rank-into-rank embedding, one can generate a free self-distributive algebra, and the Laver tables are finite quotient algebras obtained from the rank-into-rank embeddings.

For more information, please see Chapter 11 in the Handbook of Set Theory or Chapters 10-13 in the book Braids and Self-Distributivity by Patrick Dehornoy.

Result

In the classical Laver table $A_{n}$, we define the critical point by $\operatorname{crit}(r)=\gcd(r,2^n)$. Critical points originally arose from elementary embeddings in set theory, but we translate this notion to a purely algebraic context.

$\mathbf{Proposition:}$ Assume the existence of a non-identity rank-into-rank embedding. Then in the classical Laver tables $A_n$, we have $\operatorname{crit}((x*x)*y) \leq \operatorname{crit}(x*y)$ for all $x,y\in A_{n}$.

The proof of this proposition relies upon the observation that $\mathrm{crit}(j*k)=j(\mathrm{crit}(k))$ and the following easy Lemma.

$\mathbf{Lemma:}$ If $j:V_\lambda\rightarrow V_\lambda$ is an elementary embedding, then $(j*j)(\alpha)\leq j(\alpha).$

$\mathbf{Proof:}$ Let $\beta$ be the least ordinal such that $j(\beta)>\alpha$. Then $$V_{\lambda}\models\forall x<\beta,j(x)\leq\alpha,$$ so by elementarity, $$V_\lambda\models\forall x<j(\beta),(j*j)(x)\leq j(\alpha).$$ Therefore, since $\alpha<j(\beta)$, we have $(j*j)(\alpha)\leq j(\alpha).$

The fact that $\operatorname{crit}((x*x)*y) \leq \operatorname{crit}(x*y)$ is almost trivial when one assumes strong large cardinal hypotheses, but the fact that $\operatorname{crit}((x*x)*y)\leq\operatorname{crit}(x*y)$ has no known proof in ZFC.

  • Any chance you can make this somewhat more self-contained. E.g. definitions of “rank-into-rank cardinal,” “Laver table,” the binary operation $x,y\mapsto x*y$ (Might this be just multiplication of cardinal numbers?) – Michael Hardy Dec 26 '20 at 21:54