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The way it is sometimes stated is that

if we have a certain amount of "free will", then, subject to certain assumptions, so must some elementary particles."(Wikipedia)

That is confusing to me, but it seems to be an amazing theorem. It has been interpreted as ruling out hidden variable theories, but there is still some dissent. Lubos has a good discussion of it on his blog in the birthday blog for John Horton Conway. I assume it means that the outcomes of microscopic measurements are not deterministic.

What does the theorem assume and what does it prove?

Noldorin
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Gordon
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  • This article may be of interest to you: http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.4641 ... I haven't read it yet, so I can't say what I think about it. Your question just made me remember it, because the authors have asked themselves the exact same question. – Rafael Jan 29 '11 at 21:45
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    It is a theorem based on 3 axioms which they have proven mathematically:http://arxiv.org/abs/quantph/0604079 – Gordon Jan 29 '11 at 22:48
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    It would have been better for them not to use the term "free will" since that results in a knee-jerk reaction that it is philosophy. It is a proven theorem if you accept their axioms. Anyway, aren't you guys supposed to be particle phenomenologists (the word stolen from Hegel, a philosopher:). – Gordon Jan 29 '11 at 22:51
  • @raphael--thanks for the link. Yes, that is exactly what I was looking for. Now I will look for a response from Conway. BTW there is a great cartoon of Conway drawn by Simon Fraser (Cambridge):http://www-personal.umich.edu/~hlm/jhc3.jpg – Gordon Jan 29 '11 at 22:59
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    That growing out of his head is Alexander's Horned Sphere. – Gordon Jan 29 '11 at 23:00
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    Just a remark, the axioms are not proven. They have shown that they are not inconsistent, which is not the same as proof. – MBN Jan 29 '11 at 23:00
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    @MBN-Of course the axioms are not proven. Axioms are never proven. One proposes axioms which have to be accepted in order to prove a theorem. If you accept the axioms as self-evident, or as demonstrably true, you use them as the starting point to derive and prove a theorem. – Gordon Jan 30 '11 at 00:45
  • Oh, I see the confusion--in my response to Noldorin fourth down, I meant that the theorem has been proven, given the axioms, not that the axioms were proven...not expressed clearly....:) – Gordon Jan 30 '11 at 00:48
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    Ok, then my remark is that they have proven their consistency, which is not always easy, and it means that there is no chance that the theorem is "stupid" because the axioms are inconsistent. I think it is a very good result. May be more logic than physics but very good. There is a talk by Conway available online but I am too lazy to search for it again. May be someone can give the link. He gives a very good exposition and makes some great comments. – MBN Jan 30 '11 at 04:16

3 Answers3

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I shall attempt here to give an explanation of the meaning of the theorem with a limited background. Issues such as the validity of the proof I shall leave aside.

The Free Will Theorem (assuming SPIN, TWIN, and FIN)]. "If the choice of directions in which to perform spin 1 experiments is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, then the responses of the particles are equally not functions of the information accessible to them."

This theorem is a combination of ingredients which explain the hypotheses: The EPR setup of two particles (the SPIN and TWIN axioms); special relativity in a limited form (the FIN (later MIN) axiom); the Kochen-Specker "non-existence of a function" theorem/paradox.

So loosely we can imagine the typical EPR setup with two spacelike separated Observers making independent "choices" as to which of several axes to measure spin in two correlated particles: A and B, say. Let A's measurement be at time $t_A$. Then the conclusion is that no function of past properties (past light cone to $t_A$) predicts the outcome for A.

So the key phrase is "no function".

This theorem was primarily motivated to further exclude a fully deterministic interpretation of QM (obviously with hidden variables). Such hidden variables would give rise to a function of them - which here doesn't exist.

A secondary issue - where the "free will" comes from - is whether this just reconfirms an essential randomness in QM. Well the argument here, I believe, is that they interpret "random" to mean "a random function of" - but since no function exists even a random function doesn't exist (of any earlier properties). The responses of particle A are determined at time $t_A$ based on no prior information (or information on B) - just the "free" choices of the experimenters as to what to measure.

A link to the Strong Free Will Paper: http://www.ams.org/notices/200902/rtx090200226p.pdf

Roy Simpson
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The meaning is that either one shows that one or more of the axioms or some hidden premise is not acceptable for some reason, or one accepts the conclusion; or one can live in a state of "there's something wrong with that, I just can't find it" for as long as forever takes. If that means sleepless nights, so be it.

FWIW, a long time ago I chose to stop talking about particles. I haven't followed the Conway-Specker literature, since I argued some years ago that Bell inequalities cause almost no problem for random fields and no-one has so far contradicted that argument [go at it now, if you like, "Bell inequalities for random fields", J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 39 (2006) 7441-7455, cond-mat/0403692, if you haven't previously decided it's wrong and decided not to publish a rebuttal]. Conway and Specker introduce assumptions that are fairly reasonable for classical particles but it's easy to exhibit that they do not hold for random fields.

The MIN axiom, in particular, is generally not true for quantum fields, because there are correlations at space-like separation in QFTs, without, because of microcausality, any need for there to be transmission of causal effects between space-like separated regions. The MIN axiom is also generally not true for random fields. There are correlations, but there is no causality, because there is microcausality at time-like and light-like separation as well as at space-like separation. The correlations, to your taste, can either be pre-existing (the Conspiracy Loophole, if you like, but the conspiracy is probabilistic, not deterministic) or, instrumentally, they're there just because they're there (that is, we observe them, so they're there). The FIN axiom is harder, because then one has to be convinced that negative frequency components of the random field do not cause trouble, but of course classical electromagnetism lives happily with negative frequencies without problems of causality outside the light-cone, negative frequencies occur in QFT loop diagrams without difficulty, and also frequency is not linearly related to energy for classical fields.

For random fields, since they're not well known, you can try my approach in "Equivalence of the Klein-Gordon random field and the complex Klein-Gordon quantum field", EPL 87 (2009) 31002, arXiv:0905.1263 quant-ph, where a few references to other people's work can also be found. It's a niche, of course.

Move on, is what this theorem means; in my case on to random fields, but it's best if we all make different choices. You might, alternatively, be happy to drop locality and/or classical states and observables and/or something else, or to lose sleep.

On the other hand, I think you could do much worse than to accept the answer on Luboš Motl's blog, which I found very interesting, so I voted up his comment on Roy Simpson's Answer as proxy.

Peter Morgan
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    Peter, Thanks (I think). These Random Field papers seem very interesting, and one has to watch the minefield of axioms and assumptions in this area, but I would like to challenge one aspect of the Bell claim. In fact the Bell paper admits, does it not, that it could not find an axiom allowing the derivation of the actual $2\sqrt2$ bound in the Bell Inequalities? I havent studied the other papers cited to see what they propose. Also MIN is about experimenter independence rather than field correlations per se. – Roy Simpson Jan 30 '11 at 21:16
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    You need my approbation after Luboš's imprimatur? Yes, I can't explain the $2\sqrt{2}$. The nature of Experimenter independence depends on where the Heisenberg cut is. If they're inside the cut, they're correlated, qua being in a QFT state. Aren't we being Wigner, looking at our friends doing the experiment? If it's the vacuum state, the correlation is minimal, but if they've created an experiment that's designed to exhibit correlations at significant space-like separation (not easy), different story. Anyway, eg, Gregor Weihs's choices are made for him by two quantum mechanical mechanisms. – Peter Morgan Jan 30 '11 at 22:31
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    Thanks for your comments and papers. I wish I could split the checkmark ;) – Gordon Jan 30 '11 at 22:48
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    Thanks for the kind words, Gordon. Roy's answer is worthy. Being new here, my only wish is to have enough rep to be able to cut some of it off to put a premium on a question, and now I'm close! Like every mathematician on the site, I imagine, perhaps too cynically, I've been thinking of ways that rep might be gamed, and it looks as if there are so many ways that to succeed would be no achievement. For the time being, I've concluded that the coolest thing is for one's rep graph to be a sawtooth. – Peter Morgan Jan 31 '11 at 01:42
  • Thanks again Peter. The main benefit of the early Rep points are the Privileges to use the site properly. I can envisage some Stack Q&A connected with these modern axiomatic QM/QFT theories. Then you will get lots more points! – Roy Simpson Jan 31 '11 at 09:49
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It's just Bell's theorem rebranded, and using a slightly different experiment on entangled particles.

"The vital assumption" of Bell's 1964 argument, in his words, was "that the result $B$ for particle $2$ does not depend on the setting $\vec a$ of the magnet for particle $1$, nor $A$ on $\vec b$." He modeled that by making $A$ a function of $\vec a$ and $λ$, and $B$ a function of $\vec b$ and $λ$, where $λ$ represents everything on which $A$ and $B$ might depend other than $\vec a$ and $\vec b$. He clarifies that $λ$ may contain the entire state of the universe (except $\vec a$ and $\vec b$):

Some might prefer a formulation in which the hidden variables fall into two sets, with $A$ dependent on one and $B$ on the other; this possibility is contained in the above, since $λ$ stands for any number of variables and the dependences thereon of $A$ and $B$ are unrestricted. In a complete physical theory of the type envisaged by Einstein, the hidden variables would have dynamical significance and laws of motion; our $λ$ can then be thought of as initial values of these variables at some suitable instant.

Despite the name, his "hidden" variables are all of the relevant variables, not just unmeasurable non-quantum ones.

Compare that to C & K's MIN assumption:

Assume that the experiments performed by $A$ and $B$ are space-like separated. Then experimenter $B$ can freely choose any one of the 33 particular directions $w$, and $a$’s response is independent of this choice. Similarly and independently, $A$ can freely choose any one of the 40 triples $x, y, z$, and $b$’s response is independent of that choice.

Aside from referring to a different (and rather more complicated) experiment than Bell's, this is the same fundamental assumption, with the same consequences.

C & K also make two named assumptions about quantum mechanics (SPIN and TWIN), while Bell doesn't, but that's only a difference of exposition. Bell could have added certain assumptions about QM and proved a contradiction, but instead, he proved a result from his non-quantum assumption and then observed separately that it's inconsistent with certain assumptions about QM. His assumptions about QM are about as minimal as C & K's; he only needs QM's prediction of the outcome of one simple experiment to be correct. C & K's argument doesn't rule out any model that Bell's argument doesn't, except for models that reproduce QM in C & K's experiment and not in Bell's slightly different one, but those can be falsified by doing Bell's experiment in real life, so they aren't very interesting.

What C & K call "free will" is essentially the negation of what Bell called "superdeterminism", so there's nothing new there either. In fact, in the same 1985 interview where he first used the word "super-deterministic", Bell also called it "the complete absence of free will". It just happened that superdeterminism was the name that stuck. That's probably for the best since, as other people have said, free will as discussed by philosophers is really a moral concept and doesn't have much to do with physics.


The most interesting part of C & K's version of the argument is their experiment, which is similar to the GHZ experiment but uses two three-state particles instead of three two-state particles. It's not new to the paper, which attributes it to Kochen & Specker (1967), Kochen ("1970’s") and Asher Peres (1993).

C & K say

The advantage of the K–S theorem over the Bell theorem is that it leads to an outright contradiction between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theories for a single spin experiment, whereas the Bell theorem only produces the wrong probabilities for a series of experiments.

I don't buy this argument. First, the quantum prediction is only nonprobabilistic if you can produce entangled pairs with perfect accuracy and align your measurement axes with infinite precision. Accounting for experimental reality makes it probabilistic again. Second, the "outright contradiction" is counterfactual: a local hidden variable theory may match the quantum prediction for the axes you actually choose, but you can prove that there must exist other axes you could have chosen for which it wouldn't have. That's not experimentally testable. All you can do is repeat the experiment with a newly prepared system that's identical as far as you can tell, but may have different values of the hidden variables, so the proof doesn't go through. A local hidden variable theory may pass the single spin experiment or any number of repetitions of it just by getting lucky, so you can only rule it out probabilistically.

For that reason I think C & K's experiment isn't practically or even philosophically better than Bell's, although it's mathematically interesting.

benrg
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